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Until recently, the campaign finance reform eliciting nearly
uniform support has been disclosure of the source and amount of
campaign contributions and expenditures. The widespread accep-
tance of disclosure comes in part from a gut reaction shared by
most commentators and voters: There can be no harm in provid-
ing more information to citizens about important aspects of de-
mocratic governance, and publicity may root out corruption and
increase accountability.' As is often the case with gut reactions,
this one needs to be critically assessed. Disclosure is not costless.
It imposes burdens on those who must comply with complex laws.
It also involves costs for citizens who choose to pay attention to
the information, process it, and act on the basis of it. Publicity
may place a heavy penalty on groups that face retaliation when
their support for unpopular positions becomes public, and it may
undermine the ability of disliked or distrusted groups to influence
policy in ways consistent with their interests. If the costs are high
enough, some groups and individuals may no longer contribute to
political campaigns or spend money to produce political adver-
tisements, and thus the amount of speech funded by such sources
will decline. These costs may be worth paying if the benefits of
disclosure are substantial, but before we can reach that conclu-
sion, we must have a better sense of the costs and benefits.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Southern California. B.A., 1985, University of Oklahoma; J.D., 1988, University of Vir-
ginia School of Law. I appreciate helpful clarifications from Ian Ayres, conversations with
Timur Kuran and Dan Lowenstein, and invaluable comments from Scott Altman, Rick
Hasen, Andrei Marmor, Dan Simon, Dan Smith, David Strauss, Eric Talley and Dane Wa-
ters.
1. Even the appellants in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), admitted that "'nar-
rowly drawn disclosure requirements are the proper solution to virtually all of the evils
Congress sought to remedy.'" Id. at 60 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 171, Buckley (No.
75-436)).
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Voting with Dollars2 puts the question of disclosure in high re-
lief. By defending the counterintuitive notion that anonymity is
more desirable than publicity when it comes to campaign finance,
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres force disclosure proponents to
confront the unarticulated assumptions that prompt their initial
gut reaction. Moreover, to the extent that Ackerman and Ayres
present their proposal as a realistic blueprint for reform, they
challenge others to confront design and enforcement problems
that present obstacles to achieving disclosure's objectives.
One of the key components of Ackerman and Ayres's proposal
is the secret donation booth.3 Through the use of blind trusts,
their proposal will "assure that [candidates] won't be able to iden-
tify who provided the funds" used in political campaigns.4 How-
ever, some information about campaign finance remains available
under their proposal. In Part II, I detail the disclosure that Ac-
kerman and Ayres mandate and that which they allow. They do
not advocate moving to a system of complete anonymity, and the
information that is still available could play a role in informing
voters about their ballot choices.
The choice, therefore, is not between no disclosure and full dis-
closure. Rather, policymakers need to determine what informa-
tion should be disclosed and in what form. In Part III of this es-
say, I discuss the literature that studies the relationship between
information and the ability of voters to cast their ballots in ways
that are consistent with their preferences. This literature focuses
on voter competence as the primary objective of electoral institu-
tions. A voter is competent if her choice "is the same choice that
she would make given the most accurate available information
about its consequence."' Both the attributes of the typical voter
and the characteristics of the political environment mean that de-
cisions about electoral choices are made in a low-information con-
text.6 Because most voters have limited time, attention, and in-
2. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id.
5. Arthur Lupia, What We Should Know: Are Ordinary Citizens Competent to Make
Extraordinary Choices? 5 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6. See SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUA-
SION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 9 (2d ed. 1994) (presenting a theory of how voters really
make decisions called "low-information rationality").
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terest in politics, and because the political realm presents people
with complex choices, voter competence depends on the ability to
use particular pieces of available information as shortcuts for de-
cision making.7 In the ideal world, voting cues allow busy people
to vote in the same way that they would have if they had spent
more time learning about candidates, their platforms, and their
abilities.
My focus on voter competence as the primary objective of dis-
closure laws is different from the traditional justifications. In the
past, most judicial and scholarly assessments of mandatory dis-
closure have viewed it as providing "[s]unlight [which] is said to
be the best of disinfectants."' This kind of argument is made in a
variety of contexts, from securities laws and conflict of interest
rules in business, to lobbying regulations and gift restrictions in
the political realm. With respect to campaign finance disclosure,
advocates believe that the "light of publicity" can discourage quid
pro quo deals between wealthy special interest groups and elected
officials.9 Ackerman and Ayres make a plausible argument, how-
ever, that enforced anonymity might serve that objective better,
because politicians would not know who was trying to influence
them.10
However, Ackerman and Ayres overlook a different argument
in favor of campaign finance disclosure. This justification empha-
sizes providing voters information they need to vote competently.
Ackerman and Ayres spend only one page of Voting with Dollars
discussing the literature on voter competence and disclosure, and
do so in a surprisingly incomplete way. Their analysis is not suffi-
cient to allow them to dismiss the informational benefits of dis-
closure in candidate elections. Justifications based on improving
voter competence might also support disclosure statutes in other
political contexts, such as regulating lobbying. Such a rationale is
most compelling with respect to the regulation of elections, both
for candidates and ballot measures, because campaign disclosure
laws can force publicity of relevant information close to the cru-
cial moment of decision. Political entrepreneurs, like the press
7. Id. at 8-9.
8. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(new ed., Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1932) (1913).
9. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
10. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 6.
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and challengers, may also bring other information about politi-
cians and issues to the attention of voters, but that data may lack
the temporal salience of campaign spending figures. Moreover, in-
formation about lobbying interactions or violations of gift rules
concerns only incumbents and thus is not helpful in evaluating
challengers who have not previously served in elected office.
Finally, in Part IV, I identify issues that supporters of in-
creased disclosure of campaign spending must address in subse-
quent literature. Many of these issues involve practical questions
of how best to design a system that cannot be evaded through the
use of sham organizations and complicated arrangements. In ad-
dition, further study is required to learn precisely what informa-
tion promotes voter competence so that statutes can be tailored to
produce information that best serves as a shortcut.
II. THE NEARLY SECRET DONATION BOOTH
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal regulates two mechanisms
of political funding: money, the traditional source of campaign
funds, and vouchers, which comprise the public funding portion of
their plan." Each American receives an equal amount of vouchers
that can be used only to fund political campaigns for federal can-
didates. 2 The Citizen Sovereignty Act ("the Act"), proposed by
Ackerman and Ayres, limits the amount of money that can be
contributed to candidates, political parties, and political organiza-
tions for use as campaign expenditures, which are payments used
to influence any federal election.' 3 The contribution limits are
generous compared to current law and are tripled for candidates
of small minor parties who will usually need to spend more
money to become competitive given the dominance of the two ma-
jor parties. 4 Although somewhat regulated by the Act, "political
communication," which is communication to the general public re-
11. This essay does not focus on the public financing portion of the Ackerman and
Ayres proposal, except as it relates to disclosure issues. For other presentations of voucher
systems, see Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons
for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996).
12. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 4.
13. Id. at 204 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10).
14. Id. (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(e)(5)).
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ferring to any federal candidate or political party or containing
content of a political nature as described in Federal Election
Commission regulations, 15 can be funded by money not subject to
contribution limits.
16
The rules governing anonymity of contribution amount and
source differ depending on whether the contribution consists of
vouchers or dollars. Individuals who contribute dollars to political
candidates must do so in a relatively anonymous fashion, using a
blind trust arrangement. 7 At the contributor's option, the trust
can publicly acknowledge that a donor has given up to $200 to a
particular candidate or political organization. 8 If the donor has
given more than $200 and wishes publicity, then the trust is au-
thorized to reveal her name and only that she has contributed
over $200.19
The justification for the optional partial disclosure of contribu-
tions up to a ceiling of $200 is two-fold. First, contributions of
$200 or less are not corrupting in the way that the authors be-
lieve impairs the integrity of the federal political system. 2' Ac-
kerman and Ayres are primarily concerned with large campaign
contributions that may act as subtle bribes, and their intuition
that $200 cannot buy much from a federal policymaker seems
right. Indeed, sums substantially higher than $200 probably do
not buy political favors, so a higher ceiling may be acceptable
15. Id. at 187 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 2(6)). Section 2(10) provides a few exceptions
to this definition, and that of expenditures. The exceptions include news stories, editorials,
and the like distributed by a variety of broadcast, print, and Internet media sources. See
id. at 188 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 2(10)). But see Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance
Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999) (criticizing media ex-
ceptions in campaign finance laws).
16. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 202 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(j).
17. Id. at 199 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(a)).
18. Id. at 201-02 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(h)(1)).
19. Id. The identity of all contributors and the amount each contributed must be fully
disclosed ten years after the election. This provision is designed to avoid misdirection of
funds by trust administrators; the authors believe that it will have little, if any, effect on
candidate behavior or voter competence.
20. Id. at 96. This conclusion might be disputed by some campaign finance reformers
who have advocated contribution limits as low as $100 in some state and local races. See
MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 21 (1998) (discussing state initiatives with
$100 caps and noting that some were struck down by courts as too low to serve the state
interest of discouraging quid pro quo corruption); Eliza N. Carney, Taking On the Fat
Cats, NAT'L J., Jan. 18, 1997, at 110 (discussing state initiatives, some successful, sup-
ported by a public interest group committed to contribution limits of $100).
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even if one is convinced that quid pro quo corruption is a real
problem that campaign finance laws should target. Second, Ac-
kerman and Ayres acknowledge that there is an expressive com-
ponent to a campaign contribution.21 It signals the support of the
citizen for a candidate and can be used to challenge others to give
similar amounts. If there is no risk of the corruption that the au-
thors fear and there is an expressive cost to mandatory anonym-
ity, why not allow disclosure if the contributor asks for it? They
note that the $200 ceiling would fully protect the expressive in-
terests of most campaign contributors because more than 80 per-
cent of contributors give $250 or less to a candidate.
The nearly secret donation booth is also used with respect to
contributions to "major purpose political organizations."22 These
organizations include political parties, which are organizations
with the major purpose of nominating or electing federal candi-
dates, and other political organizations that designate themselves
as "major purpose political organizations." Organizations must
opt for this designation if they wish to receive vouchers from in-
dividuals, which groups cannot spend themselves but must send
on to candidates.23 Not only does the designation make them eli-
gible to become conduits of public funds, but it is also a way to opt
into a regime of some mandated disclosure. The Act requires dis-
closure of "the date, source, and amount of all transfers of Patriot
funds from major purpose political organizations during the past
two years."24 Ackerman and Ayres are not worried about disclo-
sure here "[blecause the underlying distribution of Patriot dollars
21. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 96.
22. Id. at 201 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(e)(5)).
23. Id. at 75 (vouchers collected by political organizations must be handed over to
candidates and cannot be used for independent expenditures).
24. Id. at 201 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(e)(5)). It is not clear from the Act whether
the individuals who send their vouchers to candidates or organizations can opt to publicize
their contribution, all of which would fall under the $200 ceiling. The statute says that all
transfers from voucher accounts must be anonymous, apparently without the optional dis-
closure provided to contributions of money, but it also says that transfers shall be "treated
the same as any other contribution under section 8," id. at 211 (Citizen Sovereignty Act §
16(c)-(d)), which includes the optional disclosure feature. The authors' rationale for allow-
ing optional disclosure of money up to the ceiling would apply at least with equal force
with respect to vouchers, and the equality of distribution of vouchers provides a further
safeguard against the type of corruption Ackerman and Ayres fear. Thus, it seems likely
that disclosure would be permitted at the individual's option.
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is equal, [so] the flow of patriotic [political action committee,] or
PAC money reflects the views of equal citizens. 25
In addition to receiving vouchers, major purpose political or-
ganizations can receive money through the nearly secret donation
booth, as can other political organizations that do not qualify for
public funds.26 Again, various contribution limits apply as long as
the money will be used by the political organization to make ex-
penditures for the purpose of influencing any federal election."
Political parties may transfer money from their accounts into
candidate accounts without limitation.2" The amount of such
transfers will be fully disclosed,29 although the individual con-
tributors to the political party can still be cloaked by the nearly
secret donation booth. All expenditures by political parties are
considered to be coordinated with their candidates; thus, all
money spent by parties or contributed by them directly to federal
candidates must have come through the nearly secret donation
booth.3°
Political organizations that are not parties cannot make contri-
butions of money to candidates or other political organizations.3'
This treatment of money is sharply different from the rules gov-
erning vouchers, which can only be used by political organizations
to make contributions to candidates. In contrast, political organi-
zations can fund express advocacy and other political communica-
tions with the money that has been contributed to them. Such
express advocacy cannot be coordinated with a candidate's cam-
paign because coordination would effectively render the expendi-
ture a prohibited contribution. The Act mandates that political
organizations publicly reveal the amount of their expenditures for
independent expenditures,33 although the individuals who con-
25. Id. at 74.
26. Id. at 124-26.
27. Id. at 203-05 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10).
28. Id. at 205, 208 (Citizen Sovereignty Act §§ 10(j), 13(c)).
29. Id. at 202 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(h)(2)).
30. Id. at 199 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(a)). Special rules apply to state and local
parties so that the new regulations primarily target money that influences federal cam-
paigns. See id. at 275 n.23. National parties cannot transfer money to state or local par-
ties. See id. at 288 n.5.
31. Id. at 203-05 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10).
32. Id. at 207-08 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 13(b)).
33. Id. at 193 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 5(b)(1)) (providing for reporting of all expen-
ditures, and requiring such reports be made public via the Internet in section 5(c)).
20031 1017
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1011
tribute are required to send their money through the nearly se-
cret donation booth and thus can remain anonymous. In addition,
political organizations can set up special blind trusts to receive
unlimited contributions of money for political communications, 34 a
term defined more broadly than political expenditures. Again, the
amount of the payments by political organizations for political
communications must be disclosed along with the purpose of the
expense." But the blind trust arrangement will cloak the identity
of the individual donors to political communication blind trusts,
unless they ask to be disclosed up to the $200 ceiling.36
Finally, Ackerman and Ayres contemplate that some political
activity conducted through organizations and by individuals
would not be presumptively anonymous. The Act exempts from
its partial anonymity regime organizations that do not receive
vouchers or money through a nearly secret donation booth and
that do not coordinate or affiliate with any entity that does. 7
Such an organization has opted to operate outside the system and
is not bound by the rules concerning anonymity. It can not only
reveal how much it is spending and from what sources; it can also
provide proof of those assertions. The statute requires that such
organizations can spend money in campaigns only for political
communications, which can refer to a candidate or political party
but cannot be intended to influence any federal election.38 They
cannot use the money for independent express advocacy.39
34. Id. at 202 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(j)). Separate blind trusts are required be-
cause contributions for political communications, rather than expenditures, are not lim-
ited by the statute's contribution limitations.
35. Id. at 191 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 3(b)(3)).
36. See id. at 201-02 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(h)(1)).
37. Id. at 202 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8j)). Section 8(j) of the Act makes it clear
that a few political organizations-those that are not political parties, that are not organi-
zations that accept vouchers, that do not spend money to influence federal campaigns, or
that are not affiliated with candidates or organizations that must raise money through
blind trusts-can raise money outside the nearly secret donation booth and use it for po-
litical communications. Id. (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(j)).
38. Id. at 205 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(k)).
39. This reading of the statute was confirmed by one of the authors. See E-mail from
Ian Ayres, author of VOTING WITH DOLLARS, to Elizabeth Garrett, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School (Nov. 8, 2002, 11:13 a.m. CST) (on file with author) (stating
that "no group can use private money raised outside the blind trust to engage in express
advocacy-even if the group is independent of all other groups candidates and parties,"
and noting that "[t]hey could spend the money on office furniture, cantaloupes, but they
can't use the money for express advocacy.").
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Apparently, any disclosure by unregulated political organiza-
tions is voluntary; the model statute does not have mandatory
disclosure provisions for communications funded by money raised
outside of the nearly secret donation booth. Disclosure of commu-
nications that are not intended to influence a federal election is
more problematic under current jurisprudence than disclosure
aimed at express advocacy.4 ° However, because the definition of
"political communication" requires that the advertisements refer
to a candidate or meet some additional test provided by the Fed-
eral Election Commission, some constitutional concerns may be
alleviated. In addition, disclosure provisions are ubiquitous in
laws regulating initiatives and referendums,41 a context in which
election-related speech has much in common with other issue-
oriented political speech. It is not clear from the text or the stat-
ute whether Ackerman and Ayres would favor mandatory disclo-
sure in this realm, to the extent it is constitutionally permissible,
or whether they believe it is optimal to leave it to the entities
themselves to decide whether to publicize the amount of money
they are spending and the source of their funds.
Although nothing in the Act states so explicitly, I assume that
individuals can use unlimited amounts of their own money to
fund political speech, as long as they do not coordinate their
40. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 197,
199 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding disclosure statute constitutional because it applied only to
independent expenditures for express advocacy, but finding Chamber of Commerce ad did
not meet Buckley's "magic words" test and thus could not be regulated); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (providing what has become the "magic words" test). See
generally Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, "Sham Issue Advocacy," and Buckley v.
Valeo: A Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA L. REV. 285 (2000) (arguing that very few
disclosure provisions in the campaign finance arena should survive constitutional scru-
tiny); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEx. L.
REV. 1751 (1999) (discussing constitutional issues relating to regulation of issue advocacy
in candidate campaigns, including disclosure provisions); Richard L. Hasen, The Supris-
ingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue
Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000) (providing analysis of constitutional issues raised
by regulation of "sham" issue advocacy and other political speech related to elections).
41. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 202-03 (1999) [here-
inafter ACLF] (dictum strongly suggesting that disclosure of the identity of proponents of
ballot question and total amount spent in a campaign is constitutional); Citizens Against
Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981) (stating, in dictum, that the "po-
litical system [in the context of direct democracy] will be adequately protected if contribu-
tors are identified in a public filing revealing the amounts contributed; if it is thought
wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous contributions"); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (dictum noting that identifying source of advertising in
issue campaigns may be constitutional because it allows "people ... to evaluate the argu-
ments to which they are being subjected").
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spending with a candidate's campaign. Such political speech can
be express advocacy as well as political communications, and in-
dividuals can make public, in a credible way, how much money
they are spending for such independent expenditures.42 Again, it
is up to the individuals whether to disclose their spending.
Whether laws could force disclosure of expenditures by individu-
als for political communications other than express advocacy may
be more problematic than broad mandatory disclosure require-
ments of spending by political organizations. There is a line of
cases providing strong constitutional protection for anonymity
with respect to some political speech by individuals.43 I will re-
turn to these questions.44 At this point, it is sufficient to note that
the Ackerman and Ayres proposal does not contain mandatory
disclosure provisions relating to political speech funded with
money raised outside the nearly secret donation booth, although
voluntary publicity is possible.
Ackerman and Ayres are not concerned that groups and indi-
viduals will use voluntarily disclosed payments to "bribe" elected
officials and gain special interest benefits, thereby circumventing
the nearly secret donation booth and undermining the reform.
Echoing analysis from Buckley v. Valeo,4" they conclude that can-
didates will discount such help because they do not control how
the resources are deployed and thus will not receive the same
benefit from independent expenditures as from direct contribu-
tions.46 Moreover, once the system is flooded with public money
through the use of vouchers, candidates will further devalue the
benefit of independent expenditures, and therefore rational politi-
cal actors will engage in less of this now cheapened political activ-
ity.47
Finally, the administrators of the blind trust are required to
widely publicize certain information about the mix of vouchers
and money that candidates and political organizations receive.48
42. See ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 2, at 205-06 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 11).
43. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (affirming
right to disseminate an anonymous leaflet containing individual's views on a referendum
proposing a school tax levy).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102 and 105-13.
45. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
46. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 111-27.
47. Id. at 121-23.
48. Id. at 201 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(e)).
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The information posted on the Internet for each political organi-
zation and candidate will include the total amount of vouchers
and money contributions and transfers over the last two years,
and also the ratio of vouchers to money contributions and trans-
fers over the last two years.
4 9
This reading of the statute reveals that Ackerman and Ayres
do not really mandate anonymity. In summary, the following dis-
closure will still take place:
* At the individual's option, the fact that she contributed
to a candidate or political organization and the amount
that she contributed up to $200. This applies to contri-
butions of money and perhaps to vouchers as well.5 °
* The amount of vouchers and money transferred from po-
litical parties to candidates.51
* The amount of vouchers contributed to candidates by
political organizations.52
" The amount of money spent on express advocacy and po-
litical communication by political organizations from
funds received through the nearly secret donation
booth. 3 The identities of those contributing to such or-
ganizations through the nearly secret donation booth,
along with the amount they contributed up to $200, can
be revealed if the contributors request it.54
* At the organizations' option, the amount and source of
money spent on political communications by organiza-
tions that are unaffiliated with any candidate, political
party, or political organization receiving vouchers or
money through the nearly secret donation booth.5 Dis-
closure can be accompanied by proof that makes it
credible. Similarly, individuals who spend money on po-
litical communications or express advocacy that is unco-
ordinated with a candidate, a political party, or a regu-
49. Id. (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(c)).
50. Id. at 201-02 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(h)(1)).
51. Id. at 202 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(h)(2)).
52. Id. at 211 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 16(d)).
53. Id. at 199 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(a)).
54. Id. at 201-02 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(h)(1)).
55. See id. at 202 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(j)).
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lated political organization, can reveal, in a credible
way, the amount of money that they spent.56
0 Information about the ratio of vouchers to money in the
accounts of candidates and political organizations."
Thus, some information will still be available for voters and
others, some of it mandatory and some of it not prohibited if the
entity spending money wants publicity. In this way, the Acker-
man and Ayres reform is consistent with other disclosure propos-
als, none of which requires the fullest disclosure imaginable. In-
stead, policymakers design disclosure to provide information that
will be helpful to real people who have priorities other than poli-
tics and voting and to provide it in such a way that it is useful in
their decisionmaking process. Many of them will rely on third
parties like the press and challengers to bring the information to
their attention, so thought should be given to structures that fa-
cilitate discovery of the data by these intermediaries, as well as
allowing for direct encounters by citizens themselves. The ques-
tion for policymakers is never as easy as full disclosure versus
anonymity; it is always a question of how to design institutions so
that voters cast ballots in ways that are consistent with their pol-
icy preferences.
III. VOTING CUES AND VOTER COMPETENCE
In the page or so in Voting with Dollars that discusses the
value of disclosure for voters and the electoral system, Ackerman
and Ayres adopt an appropriately realistic view of American vot-
ers: "It is precisely because most Americans aren't inclined to
spend much time and energy on political learning that campaign
finance becomes important.""8 This realism is refreshing because
much legal scholarship in the campaign reform area depends on
one of two rose-colored-glass views of American voters. Either
voters are capable of and willing to learn about candidates and
issues and then to make fully informed decisions at the polls, or
56. See id. at 189, 203, 204 (Citizen Sovereignty Act §§ 2(17), 10(b), 10(h)).
57. Id. at 201 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(e)).
58. Id. at 27. But see Richard L. Hasen, Vouchers and Buckley: The Need for "Regime
Change," 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1047, 1060 n.84 (2003) (arguing that Ackerman and Ayres
are inconsistent in their view of voters).
1022 [Vol. 37:1011
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they will become such civically engaged citizens if the govern-
ment merely gives them the right incentives.
Although some voters live up to the ideal of civic virtue, most
people will always have priorities in their lives other than elec-
tions and politics and will spend little of their scarce time and at-
tention finding and processing political information. 9 These peo-
ple, some of whom will occasionally vote despite other demands
on their time, should not be criticized or penalized. They are not
acting badly. They are acting rationally given the limited amount
of time for professional and personal activities, including spend-
ing time with family, relaxing with friends, and engaging in satis-
fying work. Indeed, even most civically engaged voters are not
well informed about every race and ballot question, and their
level of knowledge declines as they move from salient races to
more obscure ones.
This reality does not mean that voters are doomed to cast their
ballots incompetently, supporting candidates who will pursue
policies that they prefer only by luck. Although Ackerman and
Ayres argue correctly that "if most voters pay scant attention to
politics, they won't take the time to go through the lengthy lists of
donors published in the name of 'full information,"'6 ° voter compe-
tence does not depend on this level of civic engagement. In the
face of scarce time and attention and complex political choices,
ordinary people seek shortcuts to help them vote competently
with limited, relatively easy-to-obtain information. 1 Political sci-
59. Dan Ortiz has characterized this group of voters as "civic slackers" or "civic slobs,"
in contrast to the virtuous "civic smarties." See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic
Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1998) (using slacker termi-
nology); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Un-
der the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (using slob terminology). His work has
drawn attention to the importance of adopting campaign reform that is based on a realistic
view of voters, and his terminology vividly illustrates the differences between the two
groups, although the normative overtones are unfortunate.
60. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 27.
61. See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPiA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA:
CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 37 (1998) ("In politics as elsewhere,
people respond to the bounds that the twin scourges of scarcity and complexity impose
upon them.... [P]eople lack detailed information about almost everything, yet they do not
regret most of the numerous choices that they make each day. It is wrong to conclude that
people who lack detailed political information cannot make reasoned choices."); John
Mueller, Democracy and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery: Elections, Equality, and the Mini-
mal Human Being, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 983, 991 (1992) (defending a minimalist conception
of democracy, noting that "[iun a democracy, people do not need to be good or noble, but
merely to calculate their own best interests, and, if so moved, to express them"); see also
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entists and cognitive psychologists have worked to identify the
shortcuts or heuristics that ordinary citizens can use to vote com-
petently, that is, to vote with limited information as they would if
they had full information. Given the amount and quality of this
scholarship, Ackerman and Ayres's cursory dismissal of the value
of targeted disclosure statutes is surprising. It is also unneces-
sary because their proposal is not, despite their rhetoric, one that
implements anonymity, just as no real-world disclosure statute
comes close to providing full disclosure. In all cases of campaign
reform, the question is what information should be publicized and
in what form.
Perhaps Ackerman and Ayres's abrupt treatment of disclosure
stems from their belief that campaign finance laws should be
aimed primarily at eliminating bribery-like corruption that they
see infecting the political process. Because they adopt a realistic
view of voters as busy people who pay little attention to politics,
they are not convinced that any disclosure will bring enough light
to bear on special interest deals to enable voters to hold represen-
tatives accountable for questionable, private-regarding statutes
they support. "At the end of the day," they write, "mandated dis-
closure may make us feel good about ourselves but it does little to
insulate the political sphere from the corrupting influence of un-
equal wealth."62 I have written elsewhere that this notion of insti-
tutional corruption, the idea that propels many campaign finance
reforms including Ackerman and Ayres's and that primarily
structures the current judicial analysis, is largely unpersuasive
as a justification for these laws.6" In a similar vein, David Strauss
has recently questioned whether Ackerman and Ayres correctly
identify the crucial concerns that a campaign finance reform pro-
posal might usefully target.64 Others have cast doubt on the em-
Arthur Lupia & Richard Johnston, Are Voters to Blame? Voter Competence and Elite Ma-
neuvers in Referendums, in REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES AND
DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 191, 202 (Matthew Mendelsohn & Andrew
Parkin eds., 2001) (noting that "[pleople employ information short cuts for nearly every
conscious decision they make," relying on cues such as brand names, reputations, and
party ideologies). See generally Michael Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring
Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLA L. REV. (forth-
coming 2003) (discussing voter competence literature).
62. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 27.
63. See Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The
Future of Campaign Finance Laws in the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 665, 670-73 (2002) (rejecting this justification for campaign finance regulations).
64. See David Strauss, What's the Problem? Ackerman and Ayres on Campaign Fi-
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pirical basis for the claim that bribery-like behavior is pervasive
in the political process.65 Even if Ackerman and Ayres persuade
the reader that quid pro quo corruption is a substantial problem
and one that can be combated by campaign finance restrictions in
a world where other, more significant avenues of political influ-
ence remain uncontrolled,66 their narrow focus on this problem
causes them to overlook other benefits of disclosure. Most nota-
bly, they slight the argument that particular kinds of information
may allow average voters to devise shortcuts that can improve
their civic competence.
The insight provided by a realistic view of voters and an em-
phasis on enhancing their competence does not lead to a regime of
full disclosure. Thus, Ackerman and Ayres attack a straw man
when they argue against the "full disclosure" paradigm. 7 Not
only is it not the case, given voters' capabilities, that more infor-
mation is always a good thing, but too much information can
overwhelm the ability of average Americans to process and un-
derstand information and may result in their tuning out data
that could provide helpful cues. Of course, information is usually
filtered through intermediaries like the press before it reaches
average citizens, so worries about overload can be overstated.
nance Reform, 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that Ackerman and Ayres's
preoccupation with bribery-like concerns misdiagnoses the problem); see also MARTIN H.
REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 139-
46 (2001) (questioning the accuracy and persuasive power of the quid pro quo corruption
rationale).
65. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why is There So Little Money in U.S. Poli-
tics? 20-22 (2002) (unpublished study on file with author) (arguing that companies are not
spending what one would expect if quid pro quo deals motivate contributions and provid-
ing alternative explanations); Thomas E. Mann, Political Science and Campaign Reform:
Knowledge, Politics, and Policy 24-25 (2002) (paper delivered at the 2002 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor) (summarizing "vast bulk" of scholarly research as being "overwhelmingly negative"
about the claim that campaign contributions corrupt the political process by "buying votes
in Congress").
66. For example, wealthy groups and individuals spend substantially more on lobby-
ing to influence policy outcomes than they do on campaign contributions and expenditures.
See Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 Bus. &
POL. 75, 83-84 (2000) (finding that lobbying expenditures were substantially greater than
money spent by PACs in campaigns, and even charitable giving by corporations far out-
stripped either kind of expenditures); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1714 (1999) (worrying
that restrictions on campaign contributions will encourage wealthy interests to increase
their use of other mechanisms for political influence, many of which are more potentially
corrupting than campaign spending).
67. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 4.
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Nonetheless, targeting disclosure requirements to the informa-
tion most likely to improve voter competence is sensible because
it makes that information more salient and accessible for inter-
mediaries, as well as for voters who happen upon the data them-
selves.
Thus, the concern for policymakers, including Ackerman and
Ayres, should be to design a system that works to provide some
helpful information to voters in a way that they can understand
and at a time when it will influence their decisions.68 Institutions
are crucial for voting cues to work effectively. For the same rea-
sons that people need heuristics, they may need help in figuring
out which shortcuts promote competence and which undermine it,
and in discovering what information can serve as the basis for a
successful shortcut.69 Consider, for example, one of the best and
most influential voting cues: party affiliation."0 The party, cue ap-
pears on the ballot in many elections, and party institutions in
and out of government stake out somewhat divergent policy posi-
tions so that the cue contains informational content. Even in elec-
toral contexts where the party cue will not appear on the ballot at
the important moment of choice, such as initiative campaigns and
primary battles, partisans seek through endorsements and other
communication to associate the familiar party cue with a particu-
lar vote.
Another effective voting shortcut is to rely on information that
reveals which groups support a candidate and the intensity of
68. Arthur Lupia, Deliberation Disconnected: What it Takes To Improve Civic Compe-
tence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2002, at 133, 142-47 (arguing that key factors
for information to influence outcomes are memory, attention, and timing).
69. See Paul M. Sniderman, Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reason-
ing, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 67,
68 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) ("If [citizens] are in a position to overcome their infor-
mational shortfalls by taking advantage of judgmental shortcuts, it is because public
choices have been organized by political institutions in ways that lend themselves to these
shortcuts.").
70. See James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cog-
nition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND
THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 153, 153 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (noting, in a piece
generally critical of voting heuristics, that the party cue is an accurate heuristic that im-
proves voter competence); David G. Lawrence, On the Resurgence of Party Identification in
the 1990s, in AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: DECLINE OR RESURGENCE? 30, 30 (Jeffrey E.
Cohen et al. eds., 2001) (finding a resurgence in mass partisanship in the 1980s and
1990s, although the recovery has not completely eliminated the decline that occurred in
the 1960s and 1970s).
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their support.7' For group support to serve as a heuristic, at least
three conditions must be met. First, voters must correctly associ-
ate the group with a particular ideology or policy position that al-
lows them to draw inferences about the candidate's ideology and
likely behavior in office. Second, the information conveyed by the
group's support must be credible. In other words, the voters must
be able to trust that the group really does support the candidate
and is not acting strategically to send a false signal. Third, voters
must be able to learn of the group's support; it must be publi-
cized, preferably at a time when it will affect voters' decisions.
Several types of groups might meet the first condition because
they are associated easily and correctly in voters' minds with par-
ticular policies. Some interest groups are strongly associated with
a particular ideology or at least with a position on an issue that
might also provide information about larger policy commitments.
Examples of such ideological groups are the National Rifle Asso-
ciation ("NRA"), the Sierra Club, the National Abortion and Re-
productive Rights Action League, and U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
These groups actively work to develop ideological reputations and
to publicize clear-cut positions on issues important to them.72
They serve the goals of their members by developing programs to
implement ideological or policy goals, and their leaders spend
time determining which candidates will further these goals. Such
groups have an incentive to make sure the public knows what
they stand for so that citizens who care about these issues become
dues-paying members. In addition, they rely on their reputations
in order to influence policymakers who know the groups can offer
informational, lobbying, drafting, and other support in the legis-
lative process. Ordinary voters can free-ride on all this informa-
tion about groups and their support of candidates to determine
what programs candidates are likely to implement and what ideo-
logical commitments will motivate their decisions.
71. See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & ScoTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNow ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 49-53 (1996) (describing the use of membership in groups
as a shortcut to broader conclusions ' about ideology); PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL.,
REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 113 (1991) (noting that
voters can draw conclusions about ideology and positions on particular issues from knowl-
edge of the groups to which candidates belong).
72. See LuPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 61, at 207 (discussing incentives of peak or-
ganizations "to take coherent and reliable policy positions on issues important to their
members" and "to create reliable brand names that voters can use as a cue").
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Not only ideological'groups provide helpful information for vot-
ers; knowing which economic interests support particular candi-
dates and the strength of their support can also serve as a heuris-
tic.73 Examples of this type of group are businesses, trade
organizations, and labor unions. Businesses work to advance the
interests of their shareholders, and it is often clear to voters with
knowledge of everyday life which general policies will help major
industries and which will hurt them. In a study of voting on in-
surance-related ballot initiatives, political scientist Arthur Lupia
compared voters who knew nothing about the initiatives' details
but knew the insurance industry's preference, with voters who
were "model citizens" in that they consistently gave correct an-
swers to detailed questions about the ballot questions. 74 He also
included in the study a third group of voters who knew nothing
about the ballot question or about the insurance industry's posi-
tion. The first two groups of voters demonstrated similar voting
patterns, while the completely ignorant voters had very different
voting patterns.75 This finding, supported by other studies, con-
vinced Lupia that the position of an economic group with known
preferences on an issue can serve as an effective shortcut for or-
dinary voters, substituting for encyclopedic information about the
electoral choice.76
Just as firms can provide information, it is helpful for voters to
know that the National Education Association or other teachers'
unions support a candidate because they then get a sense of the
kind of educational reforms the candidate is likely to support. The
support of the Independent Petroleum Association of America
("IPAA"), the trade organization for independent oil and gas pro-
ducers, might also provide a voting cue because it is clear to some
ordinary people what kinds of policies will advance the economic
73. In a study of interest group activity, Malbin, Wilcox, Rozell, and Skinner differen-
tiate between ideological groups and pragmatic groups. The latter category roughly corre-
sponds to my category of economic groups. MICHAEL J. MALBIN ET AL., NEW INTEREST
GROUP STRATEGIES: A PREVIEW OF POST MCCAIN-FEINGOLD POLITICS? 6 (2002), available
at http://www.cfinst.org/studies/pdf/int-.groups-CFlpaper.pdf.
74. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior
in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 71 (1994).
75. Id.; see also Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Inter-
ested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18 (1986) (using economic model to confirm findings that
voters can use certain credible information provided by interested parties to make compe-
tent decisions).
76. Lupia, supra note 74, at 72.
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fortunes of the IPAA membership. Accurate conclusions about
candidates' platforms can be drawn from support of groups such
as law enforcement officers' organizations, the American Medical
Association, large agricultural concerns like Tyson Foods or
Archer Daniels Midland, or the automobile industry.
The cue based on support of economic organizations may be
less helpful than the cue provided by ideological groups for a
number of reasons, however. Some economic interests contribute
to both parties and thus dilute the strength of the cue. That is not
the case for all such groups; for example, certain groups and
businesses like the American Trial Lawyers Association
("ATLA"), the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), or tobacco companies have con-
tributed overwhelmingly to candidates of one party. Other com-
panies are frequently double-givers with contributions to both
parties,77 presumably because they are mainly working to make
their issues salient to all lawmakers in order to gain access and to
set the agenda, no matter who wins the election. In addition,
firms and other economic groups do not invest in a political brand
name in the same way that ideological groups do; therefore, vot-
ers may not be able to easily associate a particular firm or indus-
try with clear policy positions. Nonetheless, knowing that the
steel industry strongly supports a candidate allows many voters
to draw valid inferences about her views on trade policy, just as
knowing of. the American Petroleum Institute's support might al-
low accurate conclusions about the candidate's view of energy or
environmental policies.
77. See Press Release, Common Cause, You Get What You Pay For (Sept. 2000),
available at http://www.commoncause.org/publications/sept00/softmoney/sept00softmoney.
pdf) (providing figures for various companies and trade organizations, including double-
givers and those that gave primarily to one party); Press Release, Public Campaign, Who-
ever Wins, They Win (Mar. 3, 2000), available at http://www.publiccampaign.
org/press-releases/pr3_3_00.html (providing figures relating to top double-givers in 2000
presidential election); see also MALBIN ET AL., supra note 73, at 14-15 (noting that prag-
matic groups tend to give to both parties, party leaders, and key legislators); Brody Mul-
lins, The Democrats' New Donations, 33 NAT'L J., 2928, 2928 (noting that giving patterns
change when the party in power of Congress shifts). Although ideological groups may also
change their activities to account for changes in the balance of power in government, they
generally do so in ways that preserve or clarify their reputations. For example, the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union recently hired former Representatives Dick Armey and Bob Barr
to advance its issues in the new Republican Congress. See Jill Lawrence, Conservative Fa-
vorites To Join ACLU, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2002, at 2A. This decision was motivated by
the Republican majorities in both houses after the 2002 elections, but it also clearly sig-
nals that the ACLU's agenda is often more libertarian than it is politically liberal.
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Some groups cannot be classified easily into one of these two
categories, but knowing of their support for candidates may be
helpful to some voters. For example, the American Association of
Retired Persons ("AARP") and the Chamber of Commerce are in-
terested in a variety of issues and thus may not have the clear po-
litical brand name of National Right to Life, the Concord Coali-
tion, or other more targeted ideological groups. Nonetheless,
average people know enough about the objectives of these
organizations to draw some conclusions about the platforms
pursued by candidates they support. It is likely that many voters
will understand that a candidate supported by the AARP is very
likely to have a particular position on a prescription drug
program as part of Medicare and on reform of the Social Security
system. Similarly, the Chamber of Commerce's support signals
information about a candidate's position on tax reform, labor
policy, and regulation.
But more is required for a successful voting cue than merely
being able to associate certain groups with particular policy posi-
tions. Voters must be able to learn that a group supports a candi-
date, and they must believe that the information about the
group's support is credible. Information is credible when it is
costly to the speaker.7" Information about group support is trust-
worthy when it is backed up by money, or when there is some re-
putational cost to the group if it lies. In some cases, the groups
themselves publicize their support because they want people who
share their objectives to know which candidates will pursue their
policies. They understand the strength of the group-support vot-
ing cue and seek to encourage its use by voters. Ideological groups
in particular advertise their support in the media and through
slate mailings and other communications. They use endorsement
systems to provide voters with a sense of how strongly they sup-
port particular candidates, perhaps by rating them according to
some ideological litmus test. Their endorsements are credible be-
cause ideological groups have an incentive to establish clear and
consistent reputations, for reasons other than influencing voters;
their reputation is vital both to attracting members and to influ-
encing legislation when they lobby policymakers. If they support
candidates who will undermine their goals, they will not only
78. See, e.g., LuPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 61, at 53-59 (describing how observable
costly effort allows voters to assess credibility of cue).
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harm their political objectives, but they will also dilute their
reputation.
Another way to learn of a group's support is to learn how they
are spending their money in campaigns. Knowing that the ATLA
donated substantially to a particular candidate provides a credi-
ble signal to voters of ATLA's perception of the candidate's plat-
form and likely behavior in office. Again, groups themselves
sometimes voluntarily make available information about their fi-
nancial support because they want to provide credible signals to
like-minded voters. In such cases, mandatory campaign finance
disclosure laws may do little to enhance voter competence be-
cause information about endorsements and campaign spending is
already publicly available.
Even when some trustworthy information is available through
the voluntary actions of groups, mandatory disclosure laws re-
main important to publicize the group-support cues for several
reasons. First, groups supporting candidates through endorse-
ments or campaign contributions know that they provide signals
for voters who oppose their policies, as well as those who support
them. High profile ideological groups such as the NRA provide
cues to all voters, some of whom will support candidates on the
basis of the NRA endorsement and some of whom will oppose
them for the same reason. Similarly, some voters will react posi-
tively to a teachers' union endorsement; others will vote against
the endorsed candidate solely because she is the choice of the un-
ion. Publicizing such a group's support beyond the members of
the group, or beyond the universe of voters disposed favorably
toward the group's objectives, may work counter to its objectives.
Thus, groups may seek to target their endorsements so that the
information reaches only their members and other sympathetic
people.
Wider dissemination of the information is crucial, however, to
improve the competence of all voters, including those who would
react negatively to the signal provided by a particular group's
support. In competitive campaigns, challengers and those sup-
porting them have incentives to publicize groups supporting their
opponents if they expect the information to produce a backlash
among some voters. The media may also work to inform the pub-
lic about the groups supporting all candidates. Mandatory disclo-
sure of groups' financial support for candidates further ensures
that all this information will be broadly available so that voters
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are not dependent on the vagaries of political competition for dis-
closure. Systematic presentation of the information assures that
the information is provided in a timely way and in a central loca-
tion that makes discovery relatively simple. Whether this is a
vast improvement over the information environment that would
have resulted naturally will differ in each case depending on how
competitive the race is and how energetic the press and other
watchdog groups are.
Second, information about financial support may be less ame-
nable to manipulation than endorsements, and therefore more
credible to voters. Endorsements can be cheaply mimicked by
groups that are not as committed to particular ideological plat-
forms as well-known groups are. Such imitations dilute the im-
pact of endorsements generally. For example, some endorsements
sent to voters in slate mailings are purchased by the candidates,
suggesting that the groups may have mixed motives when they
announce their slate.79 Although the fact that the endorsement
was paid for must be indicated on the slate mailing, groups pro-
vide the notice as unobtrusively as possible.
The groups that engage in these practices are not as concerned
about their reputations as more established ideological groups.
They often use similar names, a practice that may lead to a gen-
eral dilution in the informational content of endorsements. To
protect the integrity of their brand name and the credibility of
their endorsements, ideological groups will try to correct any mis-
information produced by opponents or others. Thus, the misin-
formation campaigns themselves may produce valuable cues for
voters. If a group attempts to mischaracterize the views of the Si-
erra Club, for example, the resulting campaign may credibly re-
veal both groups' objectives as the Sierra Club works to clarify its
position.
Most voters will not spend a great deal of time verifying infor-
mation or obtaining more information beyond that which they
learn as a byproduct of everyday activities. That is, after all, why
they rely on shortcuts in the first place. They are therefore more
susceptible to misinformation than are civically virtuous voters,
and as a defensive response, these voters may dismiss informa-
79. Nicholas Riccardi, Spotlight Is Cast on Paid Endorsements: Mailers: Rapid
Growth of Political Fliers Brings Charges that Candidate Listings Are for Sale to the High-
est Bidder, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at B1.
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tion provided by endorsements because it contains too much
noise. Given the possibility of voter confusion from endorsements,
information about financial support may generally be more sali-
ent and credible to some voters. Ackerman and Ayres understand
the notion that actions speak louder than words; one of their jus-
tifications for moving to a world of relative anonymity, is to make
any claims of significant donations "cheap talk" that will not
cause a candidate to cater to wealthy interests.8 0 Of course, con-
cerns about manipulation of signals implicate voting cues based
on financial support of candidates as well as those based on en-
dorsements."' Because campaign spending is a more costly signal
than endorsements, however, fewer groups will use this tactic
strategically.
In contrast to the situation with respect to ideological groups,
learning of the support for candidates by economic groups may be
more difficult for voters. In a few cases, businesses, unions, and
trade organizations may widely publicize their support, whether
by public endorsements or releasing information about their
campaign spending. In other cases, they will try to target the
publicity so that it reaches only their members, shareholders,
employees, or other sympathetic people, particularly if they fear
negative voter reaction to news of their support. Shaun Bowler
and Todd Donovan found that heavy, one-sided spending in ini-
tiative campaigns may increase negative voting if the spending
reveals that some disfavored group, like tobacco companies or in-
surance companies, is a major supporter of the ballot proposal.8 2
In competitive campaigns, groups may not be able to control how
widely the information is disseminated, but absent systematic
80. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 28.
81. One study of the use of limited information to form opinions suggests that con-
cerns of manipulation or inaccuracies are overstated. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y.
SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY
PREFERENCES 381-82 (1992). But see id. at 356 (discussing the difficulty of identifying and
studying instances of manipulation); see also Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Do Voters
Have a Cue? Television Advertisements as a Source of Information in Citizen-Initiated Ref-
erendum Campaigns, 41 EUR. J. OF POL. RES. 777, 788, 790 (2002) (discussing cues pro-
vided by television ads and voter responses that may compensate for any attempted ma-
nipulation).
82. SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 53-55 (1998) (suggesting also that the noise that the expenditure of
so much money produces may result in defensive "no" voting as the electorate begins to
worry that a substantial policy change will have unexpected deleterious consequences).
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and mandatory disclosure, some groups may make substantial
and successful efforts to avoid publicity.
Such economic groups may be the type of organizations that
Ackerman and Ayres describe as "notorious." 3 In their brief dis-
cussion of voting cues, Ackerman and Ayres focus on notorious
groups whose financial support is seen as "tainted."4 Two types of
groups might fit this description. Some ideological groups are no-
torious to some voters because of the policies they support, but
they are attractive to other voters for the same reasons. Candi-
dates who support their ideologies will not view their support as
tainted, nor will the people who are likely to vote for them. In-
deed, their notoriety allows their support to serve as an effective
voting cue because many voters have an accurate perception of
their ideological commitments. The other, more interesting group
of notorious organizations comprises economic interests who are
perceived to pursue policies at odds with the preferences of ordi-
nary people, such as insurance companies, tobacco companies, big
oil companies, and the like. Contrary to Ackerman and Ayres's
suggestion that information about this sort of "tainted" support
has no effect on voters, 5 studies suggest that it can produce a
negative voter reaction. Lupia's work studying the insurance in-
dustry, as well as Bowler and Donovan's analysis, demonstrates
that information about these notorious economic groups may in-
crease voter competence, often in ways that the economic groups
will not like."
83. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 27.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. In addition, Ackerman and Ayres cite Elisabeth Gerber's work studying the role
that certain groups play in direct democracy, and they acknowledge that this work sug-
gests that voter backlash occurs in the context of direct democracy. See ACKERMAN &
AYRES, supra note 2, at 250 n.2 (referring to ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST
PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 145
(1999)). Although they observe that no study has found similar results in candidate elec-
tions, they provide no reason to conclude that tests of voting in direct democracy do not
shed light on voters' behavior generally. On the contrary, voting shortcuts should also help
voters seeking to vote competently for candidates. In many candidate elections, the ballot
already provides the cue of party affiliation so the information environment at the crucial
moment of voting is richer than it is when an initiative is at stake. However, the party cue
is not available in some elections for candidates. For example, the party cue is not avail-
able in primary battles; in those races, voters need cues like that of group support. Addi-
tional cues may improve voter competence even in elections that provide party cues be-
cause the choice among candidates, who represent bundles of positions on issues, may
actually be even more complex than decisions about ballot questions, which generally con-
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A focus on these notorious groups is important for any assess-
ment of disclosure statutes because these groups are the most
likely to strongly resist publicity. If these groups know that
knowledge of their support actually produces a public reaction
against their candidates, they will work to hide the information.
They may not even publicize their support to others who share
their objectives for fear of wider publicity. Certainly, they will not
publicly endorse the candidates. Thus, mandatory disclosure of
campaign spending may be the only way to provide voters with
credible signals based on notorious-group-support.
In the current system, there is evidence that these notorious
groups work diligently to hide their campaign spending from dis-
closure. Indeed, the law requiring that political organizations
governed by section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code disclose the
source of their funds and their political expenditures was driven
by the awareness that groups were using these "stealth PACs" to
evade the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act. Data that Daniel Smith and I are beginning to com-
pile and assess appears to show that notorious groups that seek
to influence initiative and referendum votes are evading state
disclosure statutes by organizing as educational committees,
nonprofit organizations, or other kinds of "veiled political actors"
not covered by disclosure statutes.8 8 In this way, notorious groups
are able to spend money freely and often avoid disclosure, a situa-
tion that nearly occurred in Florida this fall when Philip Morris
tried to conceal the amount of money it was spending to defeat an
anti-smoking initiative by sending the money through an unregu-
lated entity called the Committee for Responsible Solutions. 9 Oc-
cern only one issue and require either a "yes" or "no" vote. The relative complexity of the
decisions in initiative and candidate elections is contested but unimportant for the point
here, which is merely that findings about cues used helpfully in initiative elections can be
extrapolated to the context of candidate elections, even though they operate in a somewhat
different information environment.
87. See Francis R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design a New Campaign
Vehicle, TAX NOTES, Jan. 17, 2000, at 387, 388 (discussing the ways political actors used
stealth PACs to evade disclosure); see also COMMON CAUSE, UNDER THE RADAR: THE
ATTACK OF THE "STEALTH PACS" ON OUR NATION'S ELECTIONS (2000) (discussing section
527 organizations as well as other mechanisms used to avoid regulation), available at
http://www.commoncause.org/publications/utr/stealth.pdf.
88. For discussion of educational committees and other nonprofits, see Daniel A.
Smith, Special Interests and Direct Democracy: An Historical Glance, in THE BATTLE OVER
CITIZEN LAwMAKING 59, 67-68 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001).
89. See Press Release, Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, Despite Federal Campaign
Finance Reform Ballot Measure Donors Remain Elusive (July 18, 2002) available at
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casionally, these tactics are discovered, but we suspect many ar-
rangements escape publicity because media or opponents do not
learn of them before the vote.
These strategies are not limited to issue campaigns, they are
also familiar tactics in candidate elections. In the Fall 2002 elec-
tions, a group calling itself United Seniors Association funded ad-
vertisements in which Art Linkletter endorsed a Medicare pre-
scription drug program advocated by Republicans.9" The ads were
broadcast in areas where they would affect the outcomes of vari-
ous candidate races. United Seniors received the majority of its
funds from the pharmaceutical industry, which chose to spend its
money through a conduit organization with a name that sounded
as though it was an organization of senior citizens.91
Thus, even in a system of relatively widespread disclosure
laws, notorious groups are able to use conduits and other veiled
political arrangements to successfully circumvent regulation.
These organizations would be thrilled to see a move to the system
proposed by Ackerman and Ayres because it facilitates their eva-
sive tactics. Because of Ackerman and Ayres's preoccupation with
contributions and expenditures as a form of bribery, their pro-
posal intentionally incorporates features that hide important in-
formation from candidates and voters. The only information dis-
closed is the name of the group that is spending money in a
campaign;" presumably, such groups will pick benign-sounding
names that hide the source of funds and resonate emotionally
with voters. Although such sham groups must also reveal affili-
ated candidates and organizations under the Ackerman and
Ayres proposal, political operatives are adept at hiding the real
source of campaign expenditures behind an impenetrable curtain
of complex organizational structures. Complicated schemes are
not as necessary under the proposal as they are now because the
http://www.ballot.org/blindspot/; see also BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CENTER, BALLOT
MEASURE DONOR DISCLOSURE 18-19 (2002) (detailing weaknesses of Florida's disclosure
system), available at http://www.ballot.org/blindspot/BallotDisclosureReport.pdf.
90. See Voters Turned Off this Election Year by Negative Political Advertising (Na-
tional Public Radio, Morning Edition Transcript, Nov. 14, 2002).
91. See DAVID B. MAGLEBY & J. QUIN MONSON, THE LAST HURRAH? SOFT MONEY AND
ISSUE ADVOCACY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 1, 13, 21 (2003) (discussing
United Seniors and more positive voter reaction to this organization than to drug compa-
nies funding it).
92. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 192-93 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 4)
(stating the reporting requirements of candidates and political organizations).
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ultimate source of the money for the organizations can be hidden,
at the donor's option, by the nearly secret donation booth. And, if
the money will be used for political communications, rather than
express advocacy, then notorious groups can donate unlimited
amounts of money to the blind trust of the innocuously named
cover organization.
The nearly secret donation booth impairs the voting cue of
group support in another way. One way to judge the intensity of
any group's support for a candidate is to learn how much money
it is contributing to the campaign.93 Intensity of support can be
signaled in other ways as well, perhaps by providing a rating sys-
tem for candidates with five stars awarded to a strongly endorsed
candidate and one star to a candidate supported only in a luke-
warm way. Certainly, some of the ideological groups that hope to
influence voter behavior through their support of candidates will
work to credibly impart information about the intensity of their
support. However, some groups will find it hard to provide trust-
worthy information in a way voters will discover, and other
groups will seek to hide the fact that they are strongly committed
to the election of particular candidates. Thus, again, mandatory
disclosure of the source and amount of campaign spending can
provide this vital voting cue.
Ackerman and Ayres would deny voters this information. Like
current law, their contribution limits reduce the informational
content of contributions because donors cannot fully demonstrate
the intensity of their preferences. However, because the contribu-
tion limits are significantly higher than those currently allowed
by federal law, the Ackerman and Ayres proposal may actually
represent an improvement along this dimension. But, their pro-
posal absolutely forbids disclosure of the amount of money con-
tributed to a candidate or to a political organization's blind trust
for expenditures or political communications, so voters can never
learn the helpful information about intensity of preferences. The
most that can be revealed is that the donor contributed more than
$200, and disclosure of even this relatively unhelpful information
is optional. Unregulated groups can spend unlimited amounts of
money for political communications and reveal the information
93. See Jeffrey Milyo, The Political Economics of Campaign Finance, 3 INDEP. REV.
537, 542-43 (1999) (discussing how campaign expenditures reflect one way to communi-
cate intensity of preferences).
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credibly to voters, but such disclosure is optional. Presumably,
notorious groups that fear negative voter reaction to the informa-
tion will choose to remain in the shadows.
Of course, not all helpful information, even about intensity of
support, is eliminated by the Ackerman and Ayres plan. Voters
can learn how many vouchers organizations have given to candi-
dates, as well as the aggregate amount of money political organi-
zations have raised through the nearly secret donation booth.
Voters can look through the list of donors who ask to be disclosed
to get a sense of the sources of organizations' support. However, if
groups want to obscure their policy or economic agendas, they can
do so by using unrevealing organization names and by encourag-
ing the sources of their funds to stay hidden in the donation
booth. Although groups that opt out of the system and raise
money outside the nearly secret donation booth can credibly re-
veal the source of their funds and the intensity of their donors'
support measured in dollars, nothing in the proposal mandates
aggressive disclosure of the source and amount of this money.
Thus, in the end, much of the helpful information that can still be
revealed under the Ackerman and Ayres proposal is disclosed
only if donors wish to publicize their identities and expenditures.
In a limited way, however, the Ackerman and Ayres proposal
improves voter competence by making certain relevant informa-
tion available in an especially salient way. Information about the
ratio of vouchers to money that each candidate receives may
serve as the basis for a voting cue that seems to improve voter
competence-whether the candidate has extensive grassroots
support. Voters may correctly perceive that a candidate who re-
ceives a substantial number of smaller donations rather than a
few very large donations is pursuing policies that benefit the
mass of voters rather than a small number of special interests. 4
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal may enhance the strength of
this cue by calling the contributions most closely correlated with
grassroots support "Patriot dollars," a term presumably chosen to
94. For work studying the relationship between grassroots support and passage rates
of ballot initiatives, see GERBER, supra note 86, at 142-45; Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth
R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum Process: Evidence of its Effects and
Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73, 81 (M. Dane Waters
ed., 2001); Daniel A. Smith & Robert J. Herrington, The Process of Direct Democracy:
Colorado's 1996 Parental Rights Amendment, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 179, 186 (2000).
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frame this proposal in a way that resonates with some voters.95
Ackerman and Ayres recognize the informational value of such
reporting:
These reports will provide insights into public opinion that will rival
those offered by public opinion polls.... [Each report] will serve as a
feedback loop that shapes and reshapes public opinion over the
course of the campaign-precipitating a flood of public commentary,
as pundits speculate about the meaning of the ebbs and flows in the
candidates' fiscal fortunes, and as PACs and parties launch renewed
appeals for additional support.
96
The information provided by the ratio figures may be of limited
usefulness, however. First, it will be difficult to learn whether the
pattern of contributions of money also reflects grassroots support,
although that information will be somewhat available if the do-
nors opt for disclosure and the reports reveal numerous contribu-
tions at or below the $200 threshold. Second, knowing about
grassroots support may not actually enhance the competence of
some voters whose interests do not parallel the interests of the
majority. Such voters may find more helpful the information that
a candidate with many vouchers also has the endorsement of the
NRA and the John Birch Society, allowing a more accurate con-
clusion about the policies the candidate is likely to pursue in of-
fice. So the proposal enhances one cue of limited usefulness, while
impairing a more helpful heuristic.
Ackerman and Ayres could modify their proposal slightly so
that it would offer voters more information relevant to the group-
support voting cue without compromising the objectives served by
their system of partial anonymity. They could adopt mandatory
disclosure provisions for political organizations that are otherwise
unregulated by their system because they collect money outside
the nearly secret donation booth. Such disclosure of these political
communications, which under the Act's definitions cannot be in-
tended to influence an election, although they are likely to con-
tain references to candidates, faces higher constitutional hurdles
than disclosure of spending advocating the defeat or victory of a
95. The use of this loaded terminology may also turn voters off, thereby impairing the
cue for some. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, Book Review, 116 HARV. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2003) (manuscript at 5, on file with author) (arguing that use of these terms is in bad
taste).
96. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 74-75:
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candidate or otherwise intended to influence an election. How-
ever, current jurisprudence contains hints that such statutes
could be found constitutional, particularly if the spending is
somehow related to a campaign or an election. For example, in
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation ("ACLF"),97
the Court struck down requirements that people circulating peti-
tions dealing with ballot initiatives wear name badges and that
reports filed with the state reveal the names, addresses, and
compensation paid to individual circulators.98 The Court sug-
gested, however, that disclosure of the identity of the proponents
of a ballot question and the total amount of money spent for a pe-
tition campaign was appropriately aimed at the state's substan-
tial interest in controlling the domination of the initiative process
by special interests.99 It appears from ACLF and other cases that
the Court is most protective of political speech in the context of
face-to-face personal encounters, where disclosure might chill
speech if the speaker expects a hostile reaction, and less protec-
tive in the context of reports filed with the government and dis-
closed officially."' In her partial dissent in ACLF, Justice
O'Connor characterized disclosure laws as the "'essential corner-
stone' to effective campaign finance reform."0 1 She noted that
disclosure of the amounts and sources of campaign contributions
and expenditures "assists voters in making intelligent and know-
ing choices in the election process."102
IV. CHANGING THE FOCUS FROM ANONYMITY TO THE EXTENT OF
DISCLOSURE
A close reading of the Ackerman and Ayres proposal has re-
vealed that the rhetoric of anonymity is misleading because the
97. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
98. Id. at 204.
99. Id. at 202-03.
100. See Hasen, supra note 40, at 274-76 (providing this analysis).
101. ACLF, 525 U.S. at 223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) (quoting H. ALEXANDER &
B. HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT: AFTER A DECADE OF POLITICAL
REFORM 39 (1981)).
102. Id. at 224. Similarly, in dictum in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978), a case striking down prohibitions on corporate expenditures in issue cam-
paigns, the Court noted that "[iidentification of the source of advertising may be required
as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to
which they are being subjected." Id. at 792 n.32.
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donation booth protects some secrets, but not all of them. In my
view, Ackerman and Ayres do not correctly calibrate the extent of
disclosure, even taking into account the harms they see in fuller
disclosure, because they do not fairly consider the benefits to
voter competence. The nearly secret donation booth will allow
groups and individuals who pursue agendas contrary to the
wishes of the electorate to hide their substantial support for can-
didates who, because of shared ideology, will advocate for pro-
grams that benefit the groups. This type of influence is not like
bribery in that the contributor is not buying a vote that the can-
didate would not cast sincerely; rather the contributor is ensuring
that a sympathetic candidate will become a powerful lawmaker. 10 3
Little in the Ackerman and Ayres proposal changes the ability of
the well-to-do to try to influence politics in this way, although an
infusion of public funds will dilute their power. Perhaps voters
will be able to discern candidates' ideology through endorsements
and whatever information is voluntarily publicized. It seems
more likely, however, that many voters will not be able to dis-
cover helpful shortcuts, while organized groups will still be able
to make political judgments accurately because they have the
time and sophistication to develop extensive information.
Before we can be confident in drawing conclusions about infor-
mation and voter competence, however, we need more data. Most
importantly, we need additional data about whether the voting
cues I have described actually increase voter competence, under-
mine it, or leave it unaffected. To answer this question, we must
rely on nuanced views of voters and their capabilities. The ability
to use particular voting cues will vary according to voter sophisti-
cation, education, interest, and attention."4 Completely ignorant
voters may not be able to use group affiliation cues competently
103. Lowenstein has referred to these different interest group strategies as "legislative"
strategies (the bribery-like corruption Ackerman and Ayres target) and "electoral" strate-
gies. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 308 (1989).
104. See SNIDERMAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 176-78 (describing different methods of
reasoning used by voters of different educational backgrounds); see also R. MICHAEL
ALVAREZ, INFORMATION AND ELECTIONS 156 (1997) (finding voters had varying abilities to
use certain information about candidates and issues depending on their sophistication and
certainty about candidates' policy positions); Paul S. Herrnson & Kelly D. Patterson,
Agenda Setting and Campaign Advertising in Congressional Elections, in CROWDED
AIRWAVES 96, 98 (James A. Thurber et al. eds., 2000) (discussing different reactions to
campaign advertising of voters with high levels of political awareness and voters who care
little for politics). I
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because they will not have a clear picture of the preferences of the
groups. For voters who are not especially civically engaged but
who do pay some attention to news relevant to political decisions,
the structure of the information that they receive will be impor-
tant. Information must be provided in a way that increases the
chances that they will encounter it during the course of their eve-
ryday activities. Most citizens will not seek out information, but
they may have the tools to use voting cues based on information
that they happen to find in the course of their lives.
Any mandatory disclosure statute should be tailored to provide
only the information most necessary for voter competence. The
source and amount of small contributions and expenditures are
not generally informative to voters, so a disclosure statute should
exempt individuals and groups that spend insubstantial amounts
in this arena. This exception may be required for the law to pass
certain constitutional tests,"°5 and it also enhances the effective-
ness of the statute. While knowing the identity of small contribu-
tors does not improve competence, knowing that there are sub-
stantial numbers of small donors may be important information.
In the Ackerman and Ayres system, a de minimis exemption will
not deny voters information about the grassroots support for po-
litical candidates because candidates disclose data about the
voucher/money ratio reflected in their contributions and trans-
fers.
105. Such an exemption makes it more likely the statute will pass constitutional mus-
ter for two reasons. First, there is a line of cases providing strong First Amendment pro-
tection for anonymous political speech. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334, 357 (1995) (affirming right to disseminate an anonymous leaflet containing individ-
ual's views on a referendum proposing a school tax levy). The McIntyre holding seems lim-
ited to individuals attempting to get a political message out and preferring to do so
anonymously, and it will likely not be extended to invalidate disclosure statutes. See id. at
358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (distinguishing McIntyre from "other, larger circumstances
[where the State may] require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its iden-
tity"). The appropriateness of a narrow reading is supported by the result in Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002), where the Court described
the activity it was concerned with as part of the method of communication for "'the poorly
financed causes of little people.'" Id. at 2088 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 146 (1943)). Second, a federal district court recently struck down provisions of the
disclosure statute affecting section 527 organizations because the law was not narrowly
tailored to provide only the information that served the government's interest in "'in-
creas[ing] the fund of information'" for voters. Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v.
United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1333 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 81 (1976)).
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It is worth considering a broader exemption for individuals who
spend money for political and election-related communication.
Arguably, information about spending by individuals is generally
less helpful to voters than information about group support. In a
few cases, such information meets the conditions for effective vot-
ing shortcuts. Some people, such as Gloria Steinem, Ross Perot,
or William Bennett, have reputations that allow voters to draw
accurate inferences about the ideologies of the candidates they
support, and information about their campaign spending may be
more credible than cues provided by their public endorsements. It
may also be helpful for voters to know that a candidate is sup-
ported primarily by the large donations of out-of-state individu-
als, suggesting that she will be less attentive to local needs. °6 In
most cases, however, support by individuals is not an effective
heuristic because most well-known people do not have clear repu-
tations for policy positions. For example, what information is con-
veyed by substantial financial support from Bill Gates? The can-
didate might support policies that benefit Microsoft specifically
and information technology generally, but perhaps Gates's sup-
port is a product of the candidate's positions on educational is-
sues. More often than ideological or economic groups, individuals
act from a mixture of motives, so the signal their support provides
is less informative. 10 7
Disclosure about spending by individuals is problematic as well
because it may raise distinct constitutional concerns. The recent
cases protecting anonymous speech have concerned ordinary peo-
ple participating in the political process in a relatively unsophis-
ticated way.'0 8 Some of these people seek anonymity because they
fear retaliation for supporting ideas and candidates who are vio-
lently disliked by the majority. This concern about hostile reac-
tions to those pursuing unpopular causes is one that courts seek
to address. Drawing on NAACP v. Alabama, °9 the Supreme
Court in Buckley v. Valeo required that minor political parties be
allowed an exemption from disclosure if they presented specific
106. See, e.g., Smith & Herrington, supra note 94, at 191.
107. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348
(characterizing the case as concerning "a handbill written by a private citizen who is not
known to the recipient").
109. 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
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evidence of hostility, threats, harassment, and reprisals."1 A few
years later, the Court applied that exemption to the Socialist
Workers Party after the Party submitted proof of threatening
phone calls, hate mail, destruction of property, police harassment,
and shots fired at an office."' Thus, at the least, any disclosure
statute must allow a method for members of similar groups to
avoid publicity of their contributions and spending." 2 But if peo-
ple must apply to a court or administrative agency for an exemp-
tion, the mere fact that they are asking for protection from disclo-
sure signals that they may be affiliated with a despised group or
policy.' 3 Thus, providing an exemption that is applied on a case-
by-case basis may still chill the speech if no person is willing to go
through the exemption process. In that case, a more general ex-
emption may be warranted.
The benefits of such a general exemption for individuals must
be weighed against the possibilities it raises for circumvention.
Those who control notorious groups that do not face violent re-
taliation if their support is disclosed but that fear a negative
voter reaction will use any exemption to send their financial sup-
port through individuals. Just as in many contexts of political
speech, balancing is required. Drafters of disclosure statutes
must compare the danger posed by disclosure of despised view-
points with the danger of circumvention posed by a broad exemp-
tion. The best solution may be to adopt an exemption for small
and moderate-sized expenditures by individuals, but still to re-
quire disclosure of large amounts of political spending by indi-
viduals. Such an exemption would be an expansion of a general
de minimis exemption that would apply to groups as well as indi-
viduals. In the rare case that an individual who is not covered by
the statute's exemptions worries that publicity will subject him to
violent and hostile reactions, he (or the group he belongs to) can
petition a court for anonymity. Additional study of current meth-
ods of circumventing disclosure laws as well as further debate of
110. 424 U.S. at 74.
111. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982).
112. See also Hasen, supra note 40, at 280 (suggesting that such groups should be al-
lowed to make ex parte sealed motions to engage in anonymous speech).
113. Cf. TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 96 (1995) (noting that when public opinion is highly concen-
trated, "[p]eople who request a secret ballot [when the default rule is open voting] are
therefore suspected of holding dissenting views. Their demands do reveal new information
about their private preferences, thus exposing them to retaliation").
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the constitutional and policy issues will help policymakers tailor
the exemptions in a disclosure statute.
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal also highlights another de-
sign feature of disclosure statutes: the structure of disclosure.
Their blind trust reporting system makes information available
in an accessible format,114 especially to political entrepreneurs
like the media and challengers who are usually the conduits of in-
formation to relatively uninformed voters. Ordinary citizens rely
on a system of fire alarms to bring important information to their
attention.115 Thus, the key question in assessing disclosure is
whether the source of these alarms-journalists and other politi-
cal actors-can find the information and understand it. '16 Current
federal disclosure systems have come under attack recently be-
cause they do not provide centralized access to data required un-
der various disclosure statutes; they do not present the informa-
tion in an accessible and easily-searchable formats; and they
present duplicative information in confusing ways. 7 As disclo-
sure laws become less of an afterthought in the campaign finance
system, more emphasis should be placed on the method and
structure of disclosure.
Arguably, broader disclosure of voting cues that are more help-
ful than those currently available may lead to undesirable infor-
mation cascades. Information cascades, which are not necessarily
harmful phenomena, are related to the use of heuristics because
they can occur when individuals act on the basis of others' behav-
ior, rather than on their own information and judgment.1 ' As the
literature on voting cues demonstrates, when individuals take ac-
tions that are informative to others they can produce positive ex-
ternalities. 9 However, at some point, an information cascade
may develop as the behavior occurs not because of any private in-
114. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 2, at 94.
115. See POPKIN, supra note 6, at 48 (illustrating how voters look for fire alarms in the
media).
116. See id. at 47-49 (applying concepts of fire alarms and police patrols to voter deci-
sionmaking).
117. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE, WEBSITE
WOES: THE FEDERAL NON-SYSTEM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 43 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.cfinst.orgdisclosure/pdf/websitewoes.pdf.
118. Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity,
Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 151, 152.
119. Id. at 156.
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formation, but only because people are following the herd. 2 ° The
harm of information cascades can be serious, as Eric Talley de-
scribes:
In the aggregate, serial decisions to follow the herd may lead to a
form of group stagnation, curtailing the learning process not only for
the marginal actor, but also for all who succeed her. Groups of actors
caught within a cascade are therefore prone to severe lapses in
judgment, and one can never be confident that the resulting trajec-
tory of behavior-no matter how stable-reflects a desirable social
policy.
12 1
Broader disclosure concerning the support of various groups for
political candidates can pose the threat of more or deeper infor-
mation cascades if the availability of this generally reliable voting
cue convinces people who work now to develop private informa-
tion to rely instead on the cue.122 If fewer people act on the basis
of their own judgment and more act because of the signals they
observe others sending, then cascades not only develop more
quickly, but they may also be stronger. 123 In some cases, publicity
of certain information by the government in a centralized location
can actually increase the chance of cascades because more people
will use this relatively cheap information rather than spending
time to research and learn on their own.
124
Although further study of the phenomenon of information cas-
cades in politics is necessary, disclosure of group support for can-
didates seems unlikely to significantly increase the number of
undesirable cascades and may actually forestall some from occur-
ring. First, most individuals and groups who currently develop
private information about candidates are likely to continue to
produce such information, even with the easy availability of the
voting cue. Groups themselves must be sure of the ideology of
candidates they support to ensure that their interests will be
120. See id. at 152.
121. Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 90 (1999);
see also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 685-86 (1999) (defining information cascades).
122. For a related conclusion, see ALVAREZ, supra note 104, at 107-08 (providing data
that suggests that voters who rely on the party cue may so heavily rely on this "informa-
tion filter" that they become "less informed about the policy positions of the candidates").
123. See Talley, supra note 121, at 89.
124. See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 118, at 163 (noting also that sometimes gov-
ernment disclosure can reduce the incidence and severity of cascades because it provides
new information that can disrupt herding).
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served by policymakers. Some people may reduce the time they
spend discussing and reading about politics if they can vote com-
petently solely on the basis of voting cues, but my sense is that
most individuals who study politics and candidates do so largely
because they enjoy it or think of themselves as civically virtuous
citizens.
In addition, group-support voting cues actually introduce rela-
tively substantial information about various interest groups and
the intensity of their electoral support into an environment now
dominated by one prevalent binary cue (party affiliation). Theo-
rists argue that in some circumstances additional and more var-
ied information is the best way to avoid information cascades.125
In the end, the existence and severity of cascades depends on a
number of factors, including the timing of disclosure and the in-
teraction with other phenomena such as reputational cascades.
126
More study is required before we can reach conclusions about
whether cues actually improve voter competence or work, some-
times unexpectedly, to undermine it.
Not surprisingly, those who focus on voter competence identify
the design and implementation of disclosure statutes as signifi-
cant features of the political environment. 127 Precisely because it
is not a complete anonymity statute, the Ackerman and Ayres
proposal allows scholars to focus on the effects of a particular
kind of structure for disclosure. If a state adopted their proposal,
we would have the benefit of a limited experiment with this sys-
tem. A number of states have recently adopted innovative cam-
paign finance laws, including public financing systems and very
stringent limits on campaign contributions, through the mecha-
nism of direct democracy that allows voters to bypass self-
interested legislators. 128
125. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 121, at 755.
126. See id. at 761 (discussing the relationship between two types of cascades).
127. See, e.g., Garrett & Gerber, supra note 94, at 91-94; Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur
Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct Legislative Elections, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 157 (S.L. Elkin & K.E. Soltan eds., 1999); see also PAGE &
SHAPIRO, supra note 81, at 382 (stating that understanding how voters form opinions
leads to emphasis on improving the informational system).
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V. CONCLUSION
Campaign finance reform, like any reform of political institu-
tions, ought to empower real people to make decisions that reflect
their preferences. Targeted and well-designed disclosure statutes
are part of that sort of pragmatic reform, but they must be
drafted with a realistic vision of voters. Ackerman and Ayres con-
struct their proposal with such a view of voters, but then they ad-
vocate a structure that allows groups to hide their political ex-
penditures. Groups that fear voter backlash if their support of
candidates is known will take advantage of the nearly secret do-
nation booth to make sure that voters will not come to the voting
booth armed with information that could help them vote compe-
tently. Not all groups will resort to subterfuge to hide their sup-
port from the electorate, but voter competence should not depend
on the voluntary actions of active participants in the political
process. Instead, the substantial systemic interest of enhancing
voter competence justifies widespread and mandatory disclosure
statutes, targeted to provide the sort of information that voters
can use effectively.
Despite its flaws, the innovative design of the Ackerman and
Ayres proposal allows us to think about different kinds of voting
cues and new ways of making information salient, a genuine con-
tribution by a creative proposal. Daniel Lowenstein has observed
that Voting with Dollars serves as a "heuristic device, useful as a
means of bringing out different features of the campaign finance
system and casting light on different reform perspectives."129 This
observation seems especially appropriate in the context of disclo-
sure. Ackerman and Ayres's provocative thought experiment-
their heuristic-has provided us an opportunity to think more
rigorously about the heuristics that voters could use competently
and how the government could assist them.
tions from political parties and PACs).
129. See Lowenstein, supra note 95 (manuscript at 36).
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